# Ethnic Categorization and Cross-Generational Boundary Crossing in China

**Hua-Yu Sebastian Cherng**[1,2]**, Emily Hannum**
*The University of Pennsylvania*

**Meiyan Wang**
*Chinese Academy of Social Sciences*

**April 2, 2012**

**ABSTRACT**

Research on ethnic differences in economic status, education and social welfare in China tends to treat ethnic categories as fixed. However, demographic accounting exercises have indicated that the period between China's 1982 and 1990 censuses was one in which some ethnic minority groups' numbers increased more than was explainable by demographic processes, suggesting that substantial "ethnic re-identification" occurred. This paper investigates such ethnic boundary crossing in China from a cross-generational perspective, by considering the case of children of inter-ethnic parents (meaning that one parent is Han and one is minority). We focus on "strategic identification" of children as minorities among inter-ethnic parents.

Using 1 percent samples of the 1982 and 1990 censuses in China, we show that this form of boundary crossing increased from 1982 to 1990; that it was more prevalent among better-educated parents and in households in which the father (rather than the mother) was a minority member; and that it was positively associated with ethnic groups' degree of geographic assimilation, educational attainment, cultural representation, and historical elite status. Proxies for policy incentives in education and family planning did not show expected associations with strategic identification, perhaps due to problems in the operationalization of these concepts. Findings highlight certain permeabilities in ethnic boundaries in China, and illustrate that boundary-crossing can happen in ways that reinforce the existing socioeconomic advantage of certain groups.

[1]Corresponding author. *E-mail* address: cherng@gse.upenn.edu
[2]Cherng's time was supported by an Institute of Education Sciences Fellowship from the U.S. Department of Education, through Grant #R305B090015.

## Introduction

As in other countries, in China, concepts related to ethnicity and group classifications have fluctuated over the course of history, as salient boundaries have shifted with particular historical, socio-political and economic contexts. In the PRC period, a fixed set of categories emerged to define "official" ethnic identity, and to identify majority and minority populations. The degree to which these categories correspond to commonly held definitions of ethnicity is sometimes contested in the literature, but the categories are practically meaningful in that they condition rights to certain benefits in society. Studies in economics, sociology and demography have investigated ethnic differences in education, occupation, employment, economic status, and health, and anthropologists have investigated the economic and social welfare and activities of members of particular ethnic groups. However, potential fluidity in the categories themselves has received somewhat less attention. This omission is important, as studies of trends in welfare by ethnic group tend to assume that the boundaries of groups are fixed.

There is good reason to believe that this not the case at certain time points in China. Demographic accounting exercises have indicated that there must have been a substantial "re-identification" of formerly Han population groups as ethnic minorities during the 1980s (Hoddie 1998). However, in China, ethnic boundary crossing has been little explored other than via demographic accounting studies.

In this paper, we investigate ethnic boundary crossing in a cross-generational context. Using census data from 1982 and 1990, we investigate the likelihood that children of inter-ethnic (Han and minority) parents are identified as minority. This is a group for which parents have a choice about the identity of children, and so this group represents an interesting opportunity with which to evaluate theories about boundary crossing. Drawing on theories of ethnic identity

formation and shifts, we investigate first the numbers of children with inter-ethnic parents overall, by ethnic category of the child, and over time. As a shorthand technique, we refer to children in such circumstances as "strategically identified." Next, focusing on inter-ethnic households, we investigate the likelihood that a child is identified as a minority, overall, by the ethnic category of the parent, and over time. Finally, focusing again on inter-ethnic households, we investigate contextual, group, and individual factors associated with identification of the child as a minority.

**Framework**

To develop hypotheses about how inter-ethnic parents in China identify children, we refer to a cross-national literature that has investigated and patterns of ethnic boundary crossing across time and across groups in various global contexts[1], and theorized the causes of boundary crossing (Blum 2001;Nagel 1994; Wimmer 2008). This literature has proposed a number of ideas about factors that might explain boundary-crossing.

One piece of the story is the larger socio-political and cultural context in which group identities are forged. One very concrete element of context is the emergence or existence of policies that incentivize identification with certain groups. Work in sociology and history has indicated that personal or collective gain, in terms of political or economic advantage, is often motivation for the adoption of particular ethnic identities (Chai 2005; Hechter, Friedman, and Appelbaum 1982; Roediger 1999), and, in particular, ethnic minority identities (McAdam 1999).

A second dimension of context is the degree to which minority groups are represented and valorized in the broader society and culture. If minority groups become more positively represented in media or cultural and artistic industries, this shift may not only challenge negative

[1] For example, see Carvalho, Wood, and Andrade (2004) and Schwartzman (2007) for Brazil and Nagel (1997) for the US.

stereotypes, but also cause an inversion of the hierarchy of ethnic groups (Wimmer 2008). This inversion can encourage others to cross into the ethnic boundaries of the group. Increased representation of ethnic groups may also facilitate group solidarity, such as the Black Power movements in Brazil (Telles 2004) and the US (Jenkins and Eckert 1986). Also in the United States, Nagel (1994) has argued that increased cultural representation associated with the Red Power movement incentivized identification with American Indian groups in ways that contributed to demographically unexplainable increases in the population of American Indians. In the case of China, some scholars have suggested that official portrayals of ethnic minorities in the 1980s became more celebratory, though much of this presentation was exoticizing (Gladney 1994; Blum 2001; Tong 1989: 185).[2]

Although much theorizing has focused on the national context, transnational ties and global events may also shape the salience of ethnic boundaries (Wimmer 2008). Groups with strong cultural ties to a homeland outside of their nation of residence may find support for a minority identity. In addition, global events may shape national portrayals of and discourses about particular ethnic groups.

Beyond contextual factors, group characteristics may shape the likelihood of strategic identity. Two elements of group characteristics have been particularly important: group dissimilarity from the majority population, often operationalized as geographic isolation, and group socioeconomic status. Geographic and socioeconomic differences between groups can be linked to the degree of closure within groups, and to the salience of boundaries between them (Wimmer 2008). Groups that experience a high degree of isolation from the majority or are highly socioeconomically disadvantaged are more likely to have greater social closure, such that

[2] However, other scholars have suggested that the official portrayal of minorities in China has varied across time in a less systematic fashion. For example, Hoddie (2006) argues that media portrayals of minority policy and minority groups varies depending on the context of unrest (Hoddie 2006).

boundaries are not just categories, but have consequences that shape everyday social relationships and interactions. Groups that are more geographically isolated are less likely to be assimilated into mainstream society, and are therefore also less likely to cross ethnic boundaries (Eder and Spohn 2005). Isolation and disadvantage may reinforce closure and serve as barriers to accessing resources that are monopolized by the dominant majority.

On the other hand, highly assimilated groups, groups with historical claims to elite status, and groups enjoying high socioeconomic status are likely to be viewed in the broader society as possessing more socially acceptable identities, and so we might expect greater fluidity of boundaries associated with these characteristics. All else equal, there might be a higher likelihood of strategically identifying with such groups than with others.[3] From a different perspective, some scholars have argued that as ethnic minorities become upwardly mobile, they become more likely to identify their children with the *majority* (Alba 1990; Gordon 1964, Schwartzman 2007; Harris 1956), though social ascription limits the ethnic options of some visible minority groups (Feagin and Sikes 1995; and Feagin, Orum, and Sjoberg 1991)).

Finally, individual and family characteristics may also matter. Individuals or families with more education and resources may be more likely to be able to adopt strategic behavior, whether strategic means identifying with a minority group or the majority group. Gender may matter, as well. For example, in societies with strong patriarchal traditions, it is possible that ethnic identity of the father may be more likely to be passed on to the child.

[3] Of course, part of this relationship can be explained by the likely reality that assimilation and higher socioeconomic status are a consequence of past fluidity of boundaries.

## China Context[4]

Drawing on long traditions in sociology, Wimmer defines ethnicity using an adaptation of Weber's tradition of castes as status groups, as "a subjectively felt sense of belonging based on the belief in shared culture and common ancestry" (Weber [1922] 1978, Wimmer 2008). We do not seek to make a case that the definition we are using approximates this kind of common sociological definition. The operational definition of ethnic groups used in this paper follows official classifications in China.

### *Official Ethnic Classification*

The name used to refer to ethnic groups in China today, *minzu* (民族), is 20th century adaptation of the cognate Japanese term, *minzoku* (民族), and is often translated as "ethnic nation," "ethno-nation," or "nationality" (Gladney 2004). The particular categories in use today were largely set in place after the People's Republic of China was founded in 1949, as the State set out to identify and recognize as minority nationalities those who qualified among the hundreds of groups applying for national minority status. Decisions followed a Soviet model, and were based on the "four commons": language, territory, economic life, psychological make-up, meaning that ethnic minorities were identified as having common linguistic, economic, geographic, or cultural characteristics that distinguished them from the so-called Han majority population (see Fei 1981, cited in Gladney 2004). While scholars have debated the procedures for and aptness of some of the original official classifications, these classifications have become fairly set over time, with few new categories created in the ensuing years (Gladney 2004).

[4] This section draws heavily on Hannum and Wang (2010).

Today, the Chinese government officially recognizes 55 minority nationalities (少数民族, *shaoshu minzu*), along with the Han majority nationality (汉族, *hanzu*), a "naturalized" category, and an unknown category that encompasses about 350 other ethnic groups not recognized individually (Wong 2000, p. 56). To follow conventional English usage, we refer to *minzu* categories as ethnic categories, rather than ethno-nation or nationality categories.

China's minority populations comprised over 8 percent of the population in 2000 (West 2004). Minority populations are culturally and linguistically diverse, as suggested by the fact that China's linguistic groups span the Sino-Tibetan, Indo-European, Austro-Asiatic, and Altaic language families (The University of Texas at Austin 1990). Reflecting disparate historical experiences, ethnic minority populations are also diverse along two related dimensions: geography and socioeconomic status.

### *Geographic Differentiation and Socioeconomic Status*

Collectively, minority populations are more likely to live in rural areas than the Han majority population, which is important given that recent estimates of the ratio of nominal mean urban income to rural income reaching as high as 3.3 by 2007 (World Bank 2009, p.35). Depending on the standard for poverty utilized, minorities as a group in China are 1.5 to two times as likely to be poor (Gustafsson and Ding 2008; Hannum and Wang 2010). Moreover, minorities are most heavily represented in the strategic, resource-rich periphery in the portions of the northeast, central-south to southwest, and northwest, disproportionately in regions and provinces that are among the poorest in terms of rural household income (Schein 1997, p. 71-72;

West 2004). Of China's 592 officially-designated key poverty-alleviation counties, 267 are inhabited by ethnic minorities (People's Daily 2007). Among villages sampled in the rural 2002 Chinese Household Income Project (CHIP) survey, about one-fifth of non-minority villages were in nationally-designated poor counties, compared to about one-third of minority villages (Hannum and Wang 2010, Table 2). Minority villages were also about twice as likely as non-minority villages to be located in mountainous areas—38 to 44 percent of minority villages, depending on definition, were reported to be in mountainous areas (see Hannum and Wang 2010, Table 3).

However, the scope and nature of geographic and socioeconomic difference compared to the Han population vary considerably across (and, of course, within) specific ethnic groups. For example, the regional and urban-rural distributions of China's minority ethnic groups tend to differ substantially from that of the majority Han, but also substantially from those of other groups (see Hannum and Wang 2010, Figures 1 and 2).

The Tibetan and Uygur populations are among the most geographically differentiated from the Han, with high rates of residence in home Autonomous Regions in the western part of China. Relative to national averages, the Tibetan ethnic group experiences low rates of educational attainment and socioeconomic status (e.g., China Census Data: Year: 1982 and 1990, "Educational Level of Population by Minority" and "Status of Unemployment Population of Minority"). The Uygur ethnic group has higher educational attainment rates and socioeconomic status (e.g., China Census Data: Year: 1982 and 1990, "Educational Level of Population by Minority" and "Status of Unemployment Population of Minority"), and has cultural and linguistic ties to Central Asia and Turkey.

Other groups, while still differentiated from the Han geographically, hold certain ties to elite status, are much more concentrated in the north and northeast, and tend to be much better off in socioeconomic terms. For example, the Manchus, who are descendants of the ruling class of the Qing Dynasty (1644-1912), tend to live in the more industrialized north and northeast, and their degree of urbanization and educational attainments approximate that of the Han (Hannum and Wang 2010). Manchus are a highly assimilated group, most of whom do not speak the Manchu language. This point is related to the fact that Manchus were among the groups with the highest rate of reclaiming minority status (moving from non-minority to minority status) in the 1980s (Hoddie 1998; West 2004, Table 1).

Mongolians also have claims to historical elite status, tied to their descent from the Yuan Dyanasty (1271-1368), and also like the Manchu tend to live in the north and northeast; to be more urbanized; and to have higher socioeconomic status than many other groups. However, unlike the Manchu, Mongolians have ethnic ties to a homeland outside of China's borders--a fact that might serve to reinforce identity. Koreans are a third high socioeconomic status group residing in the northeast; a group lacking a historical elite status, but with strong cultural ties to wealthy neighboring South Korea.

A slightly different case is presented by the Hui, sometimes known as ethnic Chinese Muslims to distinguish them from other Muslim ethnic groups of Turkic, Persian, and Mongolian descent. Hui are said to be descendants of Middle Eastern merchants, emissaries, soldiers, and traders who began coming to China as early as the Tang and Song Dynasties (618-1279), and intermarried with local populations (Lipman 1998, p. 25; Gladney 2004, p. 161). Hui are among the most urbanized ethnic group in China, as well as being highly represented in the northwest, and highly dispersed across the country (Poston and Shu 1987, p. 25; Hannum and Wang 2010,

Figures 1 and 2). Gladney (2004) has suggested that because the category "Hui" has been defined mainly based on religion, it encompasses groups with very different geographical ties and cultural practices in China. The Hui have both high rates of college attainment and high rates of illiteracy, probably reflecting the very different terms of opportunity experienced by urban and rural members of this ethnic category (Hannum and Wang 2010, Figures 4 and 5).

### *Policies Related to Ethnic Minorities*

Being a member of a recognized ethnic minority in China implies a set of statuses somewhat different from those of non-minority members. One important element of minority status is access, at least for groups in some regions, to political representation through regional autonomy policies (Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China 2000, section 3). There are several types of autonomous areas for ethnic minorities in China, established under different circumstances (Information Office of the State Council of the Peoples Republic of China 2000, section 3).There are five province-level autonomous regions: the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region, founded in 1947; the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region, founded in 1955; the Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region, founded in 1958; the Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region, also founded in 1958; and the Tibet Autonomous Region, founded in 1965.

Beyond policies on regional autonomy, the reform era dating from the late 1970s has seen the emergence of a growing network of laws intended to advance the interests of historically disadvantaged ethnic groups, with the intention of improving ethnic relations (Sautman 1999). Policies confer specific benefits on minority groups, including a better chance at entrance to university, heightened access to local political office, special economic assistance, tax relief, and other benefits (Hoddie 1998, p. 120; Sautman 1999; Gladney 2004). These policies have contributed to a situation in which individuals have moved across ethnic

boundaries over time to claim minority status—a phenomenon particularly pronounced in the early reform years immediately following the Cultural Revolution (Hoddie 1998; Gladney 2004, pp. 20-21).

Some of the most important incentives for claiming minority status have to do with family planning policies and education policies. Fertility controls in China are less stringent for many minority groups than for the Han majority (Gladney 2004, p. 81). Gu et al. (2007) recently reviewed provincial fertility control policies in China, with a focus on provincial differences in implementation of the one-child policy. The authors found that only 5 of China's 31 provinces, municipalities, and autonomous regions did not grant a second-child exemption to minority couples, reportedly defined as a couple in which at least one member belongs to a recognized minority group (see Table 1, pp. 134-135). In all of the 11 provinces, municipalities, and autonomous regions where a third child exemption was granted under some conditions, minority status was a criterion, though the details of the exemption varied considerably from place to place (see Table 1, pp. 134-135).

In education, since the late 1970s, policy makers have supported the establishment of minority boarding schools and affirmative action policies for matriculation into colleges and universities, and subsidies for minority students (Lin 1997;Ross 2006, p.25; Sautman 1999, p. 289). University admissions quotas reserve spots only for minorities at universities, and minorities can be accepted with lower entrance scores on the Unified Examination for University Entrance (*gaokao*, 高考) (Clothey 2005, p. 396). In addition to these benefits, 12 national

minority institutes and one national minority university have been established that are dedicated specifically to the higher education of minority students (Clothey 2005, p. 396).[5]

**Hypotheses**

Drawing ideas laid out in the framework and China context sections, we propose three multi-part hypotheses about strategic identity of children by inter-ethnic parents:

1. Contextual change hypotheses: Boundary-crossing increased between 1982 and 1990, due to the emergence of incentives for minority identity and the rising cultural representation of minorities during the period.
    a. The prevalence of children with inter-ethnic parents, among all children, rose.
    b. Among inter-ethnic parents, the likelihood of identifying children as minority increased over time.
    c. Indices for fertility and educational policy benefits are positively associated with the likelihood of identifying children as members of a minority ethnic group.
    d. An index of group cultural representation is positively associated with the likelihood of identifying children as minority.
2. Group difference hypotheses: High degrees of geographic isolation and educational disadvantage are associated with lower likelihood of minority identity of children, while historical assimilation and elite status, as well as high

[5] While not a central part of incentives for claiming minority status, an additional set of important education policies have sought to address language of instruction issues critical for minority participation. Ma (2007; Zhou 2005; see Ross 2006 for a discussion of language law in China).

socioeconomic status at present, are associated with higher likelihood of minority identity of children.

   a. Manchus and Mongolians, and possibly Koreans and Hui, have the highest prevalence of children with inter-ethnic parents, and among those parents, the highest rates of strategic identity of children as minority. Conversely, the lowest rates are likely to be found among the most-isolated Tibetan and Uygur populations.
   b. Geographic difference indices are associated with lower likelihood of minority identity of children by inter-ethnic parents.
   c. Average years of education of groups is associated with higher likelihood of minority identity of children by inter-ethnic parents.

3. Individual and family characteristics hypotheses: Education and gender of the minority parent are relevant to whether strategic identification of the child.
   a. In a context in which minority identity is associated with policy benefits, more highly educated families will be more likely to identify children as minorities.
   b. In a setting in which descent is usually traced through males, children of inter-ethnic parents are more likely to be identified as minority if their father is minority than if their mother is.

## Data and Methods

### *Sample*

To investigate these hypotheses, we draw on data from 1 percent samples of the 1982 and 1990 censuses in China. The full micro sample for both years includes 21,875,138 individuals (10,031,152 individuals in 1982 and 11,830,254 in 1990). Our analytic sample was drawn as follows. From the full sample, we select only children of heads of household five years or younger, which resulted in 932,053 children in 1982 and 1,123,574 children in 1990. Children of heads of household comprise 81.75 percent of all children aged five years or younger in 1982 and 79.27 percent in 1990[6].

Next, a sample was selected of children (five years or younger of heads of household) with inter-ethnic parents, which we define as couples in which one spouse is Han and the other spouse is categorized as an ethnic minority. This analytic sample is 17,107 children in 1982 and 29,591 children in 1990.

In this paper, we focus on the ten largest officially recognized ethnic groups: the Manchu or Man (满族, *manzu*), Mongolian (蒙族, *mengguzu*), Uygur (sometimes also spelled Uighur, Uigur, Uyghur, or in transliteration of Chinese terms, Weiwuer or Weizu; 维吾尔族, *weiwuerzu*), Hui (回族, *huizu*), Tibetan (藏族, z*angzu*), Miao or Hmong (苗族, *miaozu*), Yi (彝族, yizu), Zhuang (Bouxcuengh) (壮族, *zhuangzu*), Bouyi (布依族, *buyizu*) and Korean (朝

[6] Children five years or younger who are not children of household are mostly categorized as grandchildren or of unknown relationship to the head of household.

鲜族, *chaoxianzu*), along with an "Other" category that encompasses all other groups than these and the Han majority. All individuals who were categorized as being from an "other or unknown" ethnic category were excluded from the analysis (0.06 percent of the full sample).

***Variable Descriptions***

*Identification of child as minority:* The primary dependent variable in this analysis is a dummy variable assigned a value of 1 to indicate that the child was identified as an ethnic minority and 0 if the child was identified as Han.

*Ethnic category*: A series of dummy variables represent the Han majority, the ten largest ethnic minorities, and an "other" category. This variable specification applies to two variables: *ethnic category of child* and *ethnic category of parents*. These variables were assigned a value of 1 to indicate whether the child/minority parent was categorized as that ethnic group and 0 if the child/minority parent was not.

*Age of child:* This variable represented the age of the child.

*Female*: This dummy variable was assigned a value of 1 to indicate that the child was female, else 0.

*Age of father*: This variable represented the age of the father of the child.

*Father's education*: This variable contained values which were the number of years of education of the father.

Another series of independent variables used in our analyses is ethnic group level variables. The group-level variables include the following:

*Average age of ethnic group*: This variable represented the average age of all members categorized as a specific ethnic group. This measure is used as a control variable.

Additional variables represent the policy context and cultural representation.

*Geographic dissimilarity index*: This index of geographic isolation was calculated using the Duncan user-contributed program in Stata (Jann 2004)[7]. The geographic dissimilarity index summarizes for each ethnic group the difference in distribution across prefectures from the Han. It ranges from 0 to 100 and represents the percentage of either group (Han or minority) that would have to move across prefectures to produce a distribution that matched that of the Han.

*Average years of education*: This variable measures the average years of education among all members of an ethnic category.

*Cultural representation index:* This variable was constructed as the percent of individuals in an ethnic group working in the category "education, arts, and culture industries" among all of those employed in that ethnic category. Tabular data from the entire 1982 and 1990 censuses were used to calculate the cultural representation indices for each year (China Census Data: Year: 1982, "Population of Minority by Industry", Year: 1990, "Working Persons by Industry and Nationality).

*Relaxed fertility policy index:* This index was calculated by subtracting the children ever born value for women aged 40 to 50 in each ethnic minority group from the children ever born value for Han women aged 40 to 50. Therefore, groups with positive values had higher fertility than the Han, and were likely targets of relaxed fertility policies. For use in analysis, we recoded this variable into categorical form, with a value of 0 if the difference of children ever born

[7] The formula for the Duncan dissimilarity index is $D=\frac{1}{2}\varepsilon_i|X_i-Y_i|$, where $X_i$ is the percent of ethnic group X in the residence in a prefecture i and $Y_i$ equals the percent of the Han in residence I (Jann 2004).

between the minority group and Han was below 0, 1 if the difference was between 0 and 0.9, and 2 if the difference was greater than 0.9. It is likely that this index is a better proxy for fertility policy in 1990 than in 1982, due the full emergence of the one-child policy in the 1980s.

*College advantage index:* This variable was constructed as the deviation in probability of college going from the Han among individuals ages 21 to 30 with at least a high school level of education, controlling for prefecture of residence. We used a linear probability model with prefecture and ethnic group dummies to predict college transitions. The coefficient values for each ethnic group thus represent the deviation in probability of college transition for that group, relative to the Han, net of geographic distribution differences that, in most cases, would tend to advantage the Han. We multiply these deviations in probability by 100 for use in analysis, to obtain a percentage. Positive deviations mean that minorities with a high school degree are more likely than Han to go on to tertiary education; our measure assumes that this advantage is at least in part attributable to taking advantage of preferential policies.

### *Analytic Approach*

We present a series of descriptive tables depicting the prevalence of interethnic parents and strategically identified children. Next, we use logistic regressions to investigate factors associated with child's minority identity in inter-ethnic households. One set of models investigates prevalence of strategic minority identity across ethnic groups and with household characteristics (education of the father and gender of the non-Han parent). Another set of models explores hypotheses about between group differences associated with geographic assimilation, average education, cultural representation, and the policy environment (with proxies for education and fertility policy incentives calculated by ethnic group). Separate models are estimated in 1982 and 1990.

**Results**

We begin by investigating whether boundary-crossing increased over time between 1982 and 1990 (hypotheses 1a and 1b). Table 2 shows summary statistics for all demographic variables used in the analysis, tabulated by census year. The first panel shows information for all children of heads of household five years or younger, and the second panel shows the same information for a subset of that sample living in households with inter-ethnic parents.

[Table 2 about here.]

Table 2 shows that the percent of children in inter-ethnic households who were identified as Han decreased by 10 percentage points between 1982 to 1990, from 40.98 percent to 30.98 percent. The percent of children of inter-ethnic parents who identified as other ethnic categories modestly increased for each group except the Yi and Zhuang. Thus, over time, children of inter-ethnic parents were identified less often as Han and more often as ethnic minorities.

[Table 3 about here.]

Table 3 shows children with inter-ethnic parents as a percent of all children of household heads, by ethnic category of the child and census year. Table 3 also suggests an increase in boundary crossing across the two census years: the percent of children with inter-ethnic parents increased for all groups except the Manchu, who had the highest percentage inter-ethnic of all groups in 1982, at about 69 percent, and in 1990, at about 50 percent. For example, the percentage of children identified as Mongolian who had inter-ethnic parents increased from 30 percent in 1982 to almost 45 percent in 1990. The increase in percentage of children who are from inter-ethnic households also shows the overall increase in the number of inter-ethnic

households[8]. Inter-ethnic households were miniscule in number terms for the Uygur population in both years, and in percentage terms for the Tibetan and Korean populations.

[Table 4 about here.]

Table 4 shows the percent of inter-ethnic parents in which the non-Han parent is the mother, tabulated by the ethnic category of the non-Han parent. For most groups, about 40 to 60 percent of inter-ethnic couples consist of minority women and Han men. The exceptions are the Uygur and Korean, although it should be noted that the number of Han-Uygur families is vanishingly small and the number of Han-Korean families is also not large. In 1990, the percentage of inter-ethnic households in which the mother identified as an ethnic minority increased slightly for half of the groups, while the other groups had similar percentages as in 1982.

[Table 5 about here.]

Table 5 presents odds ratios from logistic regression models predicting strategic identification of children among inter-ethnic parents by census year. Models 1a and 1b are the baseline models for 1982 and 1990, respectively, and include only dummy variables for the ethnic category of the minority parent and controls for the age and sex of the child. The next three models in each year introduce variables that represent differences between households. Models 2a and 2b introduce the father's age and education to the baseline models for the two years. Models 3a and 3b include a dummy variable that represents whether the mother is the non-Han parent, while models 4a and 4b allows for an interaction between ethnic categories and whether or not the non-Han parent is the mother.

[8] It should be noted that some ethnic categories have virtually no children who come from inter-ethnic households. For example, only one child identified as Uygur comes from an inter-ethnic household in 1982.

In models 1a and 1b, groups that are historically advantaged, such as the Manchu, Mongolians, and Hui, have much higher odds of strategic identification than groups with greater isolation. This pattern does not change when controls for father's age and education are included in models 2a and 2b, though a positive coefficient for father's education indicates that more educated individuals are more likely to strategically identify their children.

In models 3a and 3b, the dummy variable for non-Han parent is the mother has an odds ratio close to zero. This means that, on average, children in inter-ethnic households with minority mothers are less likely to be identified as a minority than children in households with minority fathers. Models 4a and 4b, which allow for an interaction between specific ethnic categories and whether or not the mother is the non-Han parent, suggest that there is great variability between groups in the effect of mother's identity on children's.

[Table 6 about here.]

To illustrate the patterns in Table 5, we estimated predicted probabilities of minority identity in Table 6. Table 6 shows predicted probabilities estimated after the baselines models (1a and 1b in Table 5), models which include controls for father's age and education (2a and 2b), and the interaction models with non-Han parent is mother and ethnic category (4a and 4b). Columns 1a and 1b in table 6 illustrate that the Manchu, Mongolian, and Hui populations have higher probabilities of minority identification of children, while the lowest probabilities are seen amongst the Yi, Zhuang, and Korean populations. Columns 2a and 2b also show that these patterns in strategic identity are not changed by accounting for father's age or education. Further, columns 2a and 2b, both of which are calculated at 1982 mean age and educational attainment of the father, show that for most ethnic groups, the probability of minority identification of children is higher in the 1990 estimates than in 1982. The only exception to this statement is the Zhuang.

Models 4a and 4b show that strategic identification of the child as minority is nearly universal if the father is the minority parent, in both years, except among Koreans. In contrast, when the mother is the non-Han parent, probabilities are generally much lower and there is considerable variability between groups. For example, in 1982, Han-Mongolian couples with a mother who is categorized as Mongolian have a 68 percent chance of identifying their child as Mongolian, while similar Han-Manchu couples only have a 19 percent of strategic minority identification of children. Interestingly, the predicted probabilities of identifying a child as a minority in households with a minority mother are higher for all groups in 1990 than in 1982.

[Table 7 about here.]

Table 7 adopts a different analytic approach and examines patterns of strategic minority identification associated with characteristics of ethnic groups, including group difference measures (geographic assimilation, education, and cultural representation; hypotheses 2b, 2c, and 1d), as well as incentivizing policies (hypothesis 1c). Table 7 presents the average age of each group, a control variable, as well as the average values for the key group variables.

The first group variable is a measure of geographic dissimilarity from the Han. As expected, groups which are geographically isolated, such as the Uygur and Tibetan, have much higher geographic dissimilarity index values (above 98 for both groups in both years); however, the degree to which other groups are geographically isolated from the Han does not change substantially across years. The one exception to this pattern is the Hui, who are the least dissimilar group, but who have a higher degree of geographic dissimilarity in 1990 (68.5) than in 1982 (60.6).

Unlike the geographic dissimilarity index, the average years of education of an ethnic category increase for all groups from 1982 to 1990. This increase is not uniform across ethnic

categories: the Korean have over 3 more years of average education in 1990 (7.48 years in 1990 and 4.05 years in 1982), while the Tibetan increase by less than one tenth of a year (1.68 years in 1990 and 1.64 years in 1982).

The next column shows values for our measure of cultural representation. In both years, half of the ethnic categories used in our analyses have more cultural representation than the Han (these groups are the Manchu, Mongolians, Uygur, Hui, and Korean). Moreover, all groups with less cultural representation than the Han in 1982 show increased representation in 1990, with some groups such as the Tibetans surpassing the cultural representation level of the Han.

The next two columns in table 7 show our proxies for incentivizing policies. The relaxed fertility policy index shows that some groups, such as the Manchu and Korean, have negative values, which suggests they do not or cannot take advantage of fertility policy exemptions. However, other groups like the Yi have high values (1.324 in 1982 and 1.824 in 1990).

The final columns show values for the college advantage index. Here, the deviation in probabilities of college transition among those with high school attainment from the Han increases between 1982 and 1990 for all groups except the Mongolians, Uygur, and Hui. For the Manchu, Miao, Yi, Zhuang, and Bouyi, their disadvantage in 1982 (reflected in negative deviations in probabilities from the Han) were advantages by 1990, perhaps reflecting stronger affirmative action policies in the latter year. However, it should be noted that high values for Tibetans, and perhaps other highly disadvantaged groups, are likely due in part to the high degree of selection into a high school degree for the poorest groups. This potential selection issue complicates the interpretation of this measure as a pure proxy for educational incentives.

[Table 8 about here.]

Finally, Table 8 presents odds ratios from logistic regressions of strategic minority identification with group variables. As a first, descriptive step in this analysis, we include one group variable in each specification, as some of these group measures overlap conceptually or empirically. At this stage, we are still exploring associations of group characteristics with strategic identification of children as minorities, and plan to work to develop better measures, particularly for the policy proxy variables.

The first three models in each year contain variables that represent differences between ethnic categories. Models 1a and 1b include measures of geographic dissimilarity for 1982 and 1990; models 2a and 2b, the average years of education; and models 3a and 3b, the cultural representation index. The next two models address whether or not instrumental advantages are associated with strategic identity of children as minority, by including proxies for policy incentives. Models 4a and 4b include the relaxed fertility policy index and models 5a and 5b, the college advantage index. Additionally, all models control for the average age of the ethnic group.

In models 1a and 1b, geographic dissimilarity is associated with lower odds of strategic identify, which is consistent with the notion that geographically unassimilated groups have less permeable ethnic boundary lines. Also consistent with expectations, models 2a and 2b show that more highly educated groups have higher odds of strategic identification, and models 3a and 3b show that greater cultural representation is also associated with higher odds of strategic identification.

In models that include proxies for policy incentives, the odds ratios for the relaxed fertility policy indices in columns 4a and 4b indicate that flexibility in terms of fertility policy is associated with either no difference or significantly lower odds of strategically identifying children as ethnic minorities. Models 5a and 5b, focusing on the college advantage indices, also

show counterintuitive effects. In 1982, college advantage is associated with higher odds of strategic identity, as expected, but this effect is reversed in 1990. Taking these measures at face value, these findings do not show that access to educational incentives is associated with identity of children as minorities. However, our measures are crude proxies for policy. The educational incentive measure may be contaminated by degree of educational selection, which would be greatest among the poorest groups.

**Preliminary Summary**

Research on ethnic differences in economic status, education and social welfare in China tends to treat ethnic categories as fixed. However, demographic accounting exercises have indicated that the period between China's 1982 and 1990 censuses was one in which some ethnic minority groups' numbers increased more than was explainable by demographic processes, suggesting that substantial "ethnic re-identification" occurred. This paper investigates such ethnic boundary crossing in China from a cross-generational perspective, by considering the case of children of inter-ethnic parents (meaning that one parent is Han and one is minority).

This paper has sought to investigate the prevalence of children with inter-ethnic parents, patterns of strategic identification across time, ethnic categories, and households, and the nature of external factors that influence boundary crossing. Our first set of hypotheses suggested that boundary crossing increased over time, due to improved cultural representation and incentivizing policies. Consistent with part of this expectation, we found clear evidence that boundary crossing increased from 1982 to 1990. In the latter year, there were more children in inter-ethnic households, and the likelihood that such children were strategically identified as a member of an ethnic minority increased. Also consistent with part of our first set of hypotheses, cultural

representation increased for a number of groups between the two censuses waves and was consistently positively associated with odds of strategic identification of children as minorities among inter-ethnic families. However, the expected impact of incentivizing policies on strategic identification was not clearly in evidence. The association of our proxies for education and fertility policy incentives with strategic identification of children as minority were decidedly mixed, which may be due to the crudeness of our measures. Further work is needed to explore alternative proxies for policy incentives.

Our second set of hypotheses was about characteristics of groups: inter-ethnic couples with membership in more geographically assimilated groups, educated groups, and historically elite groups were expected to be more frequently identifying children as minorities. Consistent with our hypotheses, geographically dissimilarity of groups is negatively associated with strategically identifying children as minorities, while higher education among groups is positively associated. Moreover, historically elite groups such as the Manchu, Mongolian, and Hui in inter-ethnic households tended to have relatively high probabilities of identifying children as an ethnic minority.

Our third set of hypotheses was about individual and family characteristics: highly educated fathers were expected to engage in greater strategic behavior, and gender of the minority parent was proposed as a possible contributor to patterns of identification of the child. Results showed that father's education was associated with strategic identity of the child as a minority in inter-ethnic households. And, most interestingly, the minority status of mothers and fathers had different implications for children's identity: if the father was a minority, the child was almost always identified as a minority. The only real exception to this statement was for ethnic Koreans. The probability of minority identity of the child when the mother was a

minority was much lower and more variable across groups, though the probabilities were generally higher in 1990 than in 1982.

Overall, results show that boundary crossing increased from 1982 to 1990; that it was more prevalent among better-educated parents and in households in which the father (rather than the mother) was a minority member; and that it was positively associated with ethnic groups' degree of geographic assimilation, educational attainment, cultural representation, and historical elite status. Proxies for policy incentives in education and family planning did not show expected associations with strategic identification, perhaps due to problems in the operationalization of these concepts. Findings highlight certain permeabilities in ethnic boundaries in China, and illustrate that boundary-crossing can happen in ways that reinforce the existing socioeconomic advantage of certain groups.

**References**


Alba, Richard D. 1990. *Ethnic identity: the transformation of white America*. Yale University Press.

Blum, Susan Debra. 2001. *Portraits of "primitives": ordering human kinds in the Chinese nation*. Rowman & Littlefield.

Carvalho, José Alberto Magno de, Charles H. Wood, and Flávia Cristina Drumond Andrade. 2004. "Estimating the stability of census-based racial/ethnic classifications: The case of Brazil." *Population Studies* 58:331-343. Retrieved September 30, 2011.

Chai, Sun-Ki. 2005. "Predicting Ethnic Boundaries." *European Sociological Review* 21(4):375 - 391. Retrieved September 30, 2011.

China 1982 Population Census Data Assembly. 2011a. "'Educational Level of Population by Minority' and 'Status of Unemployment Population of Minority'." *University of Michigan China Data Center, All China Data Center.*

China 1982 Population Census Data Assembly. 2011b. "Population of Minority by Industry." *University of Michigan China Data Center, All China Data Center*.

China 1990 Population Census Data Assembly. 2011. "Working Persons by Industry and Nationality." *University of Michigan China Data Center, All China Data Center.*

Clothey, Rebecca. 2005. "China's Policies for Minority Nationalities in Higher Education: Negotiating National Values and Ethnic Identities." *Comparative Education Review* 49(3):389-409.

Eder, Klaus, and Willfried Spohn. 2005. *Collective memory and European identity: the effects of integration and enlargement*. Ashgate Publishing, Ltd.

Feagin, Joe R., Anthony M. Orum, and Gideon Sjoberg. 1991. *A Case for the case study*. UNC Press Books.

Feagin, Joe R., and Melvin P. Sikes. 1995. *Living with racism: the black middle-class experience*. Beacon Press.

Gu, Baochang, Feng Wang, Zhigang Guo, and Erli Zhang. 2007. "China's Local and National Fertility Policies at the End of the Twentieth Century." *Population and Development Review* 33(1):129-148.

Gustafsson, Bjorn, and Sai Ding. 2008. *Temporary and Persistent Poverty Among Ethnic Minorities and the Majority in Rural China*. Retrieved (http://proxy.library.upenn.edu:3071/paper=1293583).

Hannum, Emily, and Meiyan Wang. 2010. *Ethnicity, Socioeconomic Status, and Social Welfare in China*. World Bank.

Hechter, M., D. Friedman, and M. Appelbaum. 1982. “A theory of ethnic collective actio.” *International Migration Review* 412-434.

Hoddie, Matthew. 1998. “Ethnic identity change in the People’s Republic of China: An explanation using data from the 1982 and 1990 census enumerations.” *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics* 4(1):119.

Hoddie, Matthew. 2006. “Minorities in the Official Media: Determinants of State Attention to Ethnic Minorities in the People’s Republic of China.” *Harvard International Journal of Press/Politics* 11(4):3-21.

Information Office of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China. 2000. *National Minorities Policy and Its Practice in China*.

Jann, Ben. 2004. “DUNCAN: Stata module to calculate dissimilarity index.” *Statistical Software Components* S447202, Boston College Department of Economics, revised 16 Feb 2005.

Jenkins, J.C., and C.M. Eckert. 1986. “Channeling Black Insurgency: Elite Patronage and Professional Social Movement Organizations in the Development of the Black Movement.” *American Sociological Review* 51(6):812–29.

Lin, Jing. 1997. “Policies and Practices of Bilingual Education for the Minorities in China.” *Journal of Multilingual and Multicultural Development* 18(3):193-193-205.

Lipman, Jonathan N. 1998. *Familiar Strangers: A History of Muslims in Northwest China*. Seattle: University of Washington Press.

McAdam, Doug. 1999. *Political process and the development of Black insurgency, 1930-1970*. University of Chicago Press.

Nagel, J. 1994. “Constructing ethnicity: Creating and recreating ethnic identity and culture.” *Social Problems*.

Nagel, Joane. 1997. *American Indian ethnic renewal: Red power and the resurgence of identity and culture*. Oxford University Press.

People’s Daily. 2007. *China’s rural poverty elimination drive stalls in minority habitats*.

Poston Jr., Dudley L., and Jing Shu. 1987. “The Demographic and Socioeconomic Composition of China’s Ethnic Minorities.” *Population and Development Review* 13(4):703-722.

Roediger, David R. 1999. *The wages of whiteness: race and the making of the American working class*. Verso.

Ross, Heidi. 2006. “Where and Who are the World’s Illiterates: China.” *UNESCO Global Monitoring Report China Country Study* 65.

Sautman, Barry. 1999. “Ethnic Law and Minority Rights in China: Progress and Constraints.” *Law and Policy* 21(3):284-314.

Schein, Louisa. 1997. “Gender and Internal Orientalism in China.” *Modern China* 23(1):69-98.

Schwartzman, Luisa Farah. 2007. “Does Money Whiten? Intergenerational Changes in Racial Classification in Brazil.” *American Sociological Review* 72(6):940 -963. Retrieved September 30, 2011.

Telles, Edward Eric. 2004. *Race in another America: the significance of skin color in Brazil*. Princeton University Press.

The University of Texas at Austin. 1990. “Perry-Castañeda LibraryMap Collection.”

Weber, Max. 1922. “Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology.” *1922* 24-37. Retrieved September 30, 2011.

West, Loraine A. 2004. *Demographic and Socioeconomic Status of China’s Minority Ethnic Population: Any Closing of the Gap?* Retrieved (http://proxy.library.upenn.edu:9523/download.asp?submissionId=41095).

Wimmer, A. 2008. “The Making and Unmaking of Ethnic Boundaries: A Multilevel Process Theory1.” *American Journal of Sociology* 113(4):970–1022.

World Bank. 2009. *From poor areas to poor people: China’s evolving poverty reduction agenda*. Washington, D.C.: World Bank Retrieved (http://go.worldbank.org/62HINPBR40).

**Table 1. Description of Key Analytic Independent Variables Used in Logistic Regression Analysis of Strategic Minority Identification Children among Inter-ethnic Parents**

| Independent variable | Variable Construction | Concept from theoretical framework | Relevance to boundary crossing |
|---|---|---|---|
| Geographic dissimilarity index | The geographic dissimilarity index used in this analysis represents the percentage of the ethnic minority group that would have to move to a different geographic area to produce a distribution that matches that of the Han. It was calculated using the *Duncan* user-contributed program in Stata (Jann 2004). | Assimilation into mainstream society. The salience of an ethnic boundary. | The less the group is assimilated, the less likely a mixed couple with a spouse from that group may be to strategically identify their children with that group. |
| Average years of education | The average years of education variable represents the average years of education among all members of an ethnic category. | The salience of boundaries and differences between groups. | The more a group is dissimilar from the majority in terms of education, the less likely a mixed couple with a spouse from that group may be to strategically identify their children with that group. |
| College advantage index | A linear regression model was used to predict college attainment among those with high school attainment, ages 21 – 30, while absorbing dummies for prefectures (which drive educational differences because of economic inequalities). This model included dummy variables for the ten ethnic groups as well as one dummy variable for all other ethnicities, with Han serving as the base category. The college advantage index is the coefficients from this model, which reflect the deviation in probabilities of college going from the Han. | Incentivizing policies for instrumental identification | A couple may be more likely to strategically identify as minority in order for them and their child to take advantage of policy benefits. In the case of China, these benefits include preferential education and fertility policies. |
| Relaxed fertility policy index | The fertility index is the deviation of child ever born for each ethnic group from Han child ever born among women aged 40 to 50. Positive values on this fertility index therefore show greater fertility of the ethnic group over the Han, which suggest exemption from stringent fertility policies. | | |
| Cultural representation index | The percent labor force in the categories "education, culture and arts". Higher values on this index indicate more representation in these industries. Note: because this measure includes education, one caveat of this measure is that it may also represent economic differences. | Cultural representation | As an ethnic minority group is more represented (and more favorably represented) in mainstream society, a mixed couple with a spouse from that group may be more likely to strategically identify children as a member of that group. |

**Table 2. Summary Statistics, Full Sample and Analytic Sample (Inter-ethnic Households)**

| | 1982 | | 1990 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Mean | N | Mean/ | N |
| Full Sample: all children of heads of households, 5 years or younger | | 9<br>32,053 | | 1,<br>123,574 |
| Age of child | 2.62 | | 2.55 | |
| Female (child) | 48.33 | 4 | 47.46 | 53 |
| Age of father | 32.08 | | 30.44 | |
| Father's education | 6.14 | | 7.58 | |
| % Non-Han parent is mother | 0.94% | 8 | 1.43 | 16 |
| *Ethnic Category of Child* | | | | |
| Han | 91.16 | 8 | 90.38 | 1, |
| Manchu | 0.48 | 4 | 1.06 | 11 |
| Mongol | 0.48 | 4 | 0.63 | 70 |
| Uygur | 0.92 | 8 | 1.00 | 11 |
| Hui | 0.88 | 8 | 0.84 | 94 |
| Tibetan | 0.28 | 2 | 0.44 | 49 |
| Miao | 0.75 | 7 | 0.74 | 82 |
| Yi | 0.14 | 1 | 0.15 | 16 |
| Zhuang | 1.85 | 1 | 1.56 | 17 |
| Bouyi | 0.31 | 2 | 0.25 | 28 |
| Korean | 0.16 | 1 | 0.14 | 15 |
| Other | 1.89 | 1 | 2.34 | 26 |
| | | | | |
| Analytic Sample: all children of inter-spouses, 5 years or younger | | 1 | | 29 |
| Age of child | 2.46 | | 2.49 | |
| Female (child) | 48.51 | 8 | 47.80 | 14 |
| Age of father | 32.10 | | 30.49 | |
| Father's education | 6.52 | | 7.75 | |
| % Non-Han parent is mother | 51.17 | 8 | 54.14 | 16 |
| *Ethnic Category of Child* | | | | |
| Han | 40.98 | 7 | 30.98 | 91 |
| Manchu | 18.01 | 3 | 20.06 | 59 |
| Mongol | 7.73 | 1 | 10.37 | 30 |
| Uygur | 0.01 | 1 | 0.02 | 6 |
| Hui | 3.75 | 6 | 4.18 | 12 |
| Tibetan | 0.53 | 9 | 0.63 | 18 |
| Miao | 3.14 | 5 | 5.11 | 15 |
| Yi | 7.38 | 1 | 5.69 | 16 |
| Zhuang | 7.30 | 1 | 4.71 | 13 |
| Bouyi | | 2 | 1.32 | 39 |
| Korean | 0.12 | 2 | 0.27 | 81 |
| Other | 13.59 | 2 | 18.71 | 55 |

*Note:* The valid N for the full sample in 1982 is 932,053 and is 1,123,574 in 1990. The valid N for the analytic sample in 1982 is
17,107 and is 29,591 in 1990.
*Note:* Other Ns represent the number of cases in specified category.
*Note:* China 1982 and 1990 Population Census, 1 Percent Microsample, China National Bureau of Statistics 2011.

**Table 3. Percent of A Children of Household Heads Ages 5 and Below with Inter-ethnic Parents by Ethnic Category of Child and Census Year**

| | 1982 | | | 1990 | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | % Inter-ethnic parents | N Inter-ethnic parents | T otal N | % Inter-ethnic parents | N Inter-ethnic parents | T otal N |
| *Ethnic Category of* | | | | | | |
| Han | 0.8 | 701 | 8 | 0.9 | 916 | 1, |
| Manchu | 69. | 308 | 4 | 49. | 593 | 11 |
| Mongol | 29. | 132 | 4 | 43. | 307 | 70 |
| Uygur | 0.0 | 1 | 8 | 0.0 | 6 | 11 |
| Hui | 7.8 | 641 | 8 | 13. | 123 | 94 |
| Tibetan | 3.4 | 90 | 2 | 3.7 | 186 | 49 |
| Miao | 7.6 | 538 | 7 | 18. | 151 | 82 |
| Yi | 7.8 | 619 | 7 | 15. | 107 | 70 |
| Zhuang | 7.2 | 124 | 1 | 7.9 | 139 | 17 |
| Bouyi | 7.3 | 210 | 2 | 13. | 391 | 28 |
| Korean | 1.3 | 20 | 1 | 5.3 | 81 | 15 |
| Other | 13. | 232 | 1 | 21. | 553 | 26 |

*Note:* China 1982 and 1990 Population Census, 1 Percent Microsample, China National Bureau of Statistics 2011.

**Table 4. Gender of Non-Han Parent in Inter-ethnic Households, by Ethnic Category of Minority Parent and Census Year**

| | 1982 | | 1990 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | % Non-Han Parent is Mother | N Non-Han Parent is Mother | % Non-Han Parent is Mother | N Non-Han Parent is Mother |
| *Ethnic Category of Minority Parent* | | | | |
| Manchu | 42.31 | 2027 | 47.78 | 3708 |
| Mongol | 44.82 | 696 | 54.18 | 1865 |
| Uygur | 100.00 | 9 | 60.00 | 9 |
| Hui | 44.84 | 391 | 43.91 | 689 |
| Tibetan | 61.27 | 87 | 60.96 | 153 |
| Miao | 53.03 | 490 | 52.08 | 1103 |
| Yi | 55.31 | 698 | 59.23 | 998 |
| Zhuang | 66.95 | 2271 | 73.36 | 2955 |
| Bouyi | 53.74 | 201 | 53.06 | 321 |
| Korean | 82.86 | 58 | 63.82 | 127 |
| Other | 49.09 | 1825 | 51.70 | 4094 |

*Note:* China 1982 and 1990 Population Census, 1 Percent Microsample, China National Bureau of Statistics 2011.

**Table 5. Odds Ratios of Logistic Regression Models of Strategic Minority Identification of Children among Inter-ethnic Parents, by Ethnic Category of Minority Parent and Census Year**

| | 1982 | | | | 1990 | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | (1a) | (2a) | (3a) | (4a) | (1b) | (2b) | (3b) | (4b) |
| Non-Han Parent is Mother (reference: father) | | | 0.01*** | 0.01*** | | | 0.04*** | 0.03*** |
| *Ethnic Category of Minority Parent* | | | | | | | | |
| Manchu | 1.08* | 1.02 | 0.68*** | 1.35* | 1.40*** | 1.35*** | 1.36*** | 0.50*** |
| Manchu X Non-Han Parent is Mother | | | | 0.45*** | | | | 3.17*** |
| Mongol | 3.45*** | 3.32*** | 5.69*** | 2.71*** | 3.53*** | 3.39*** | 4.80*** | 0.96 |
| Mongol X Non-Han Parent is Mother | | | | 2.07** | | | | 5.93*** |
| Hui | 1.67*** | 1.59*** | 2.03*** | 0.82 | 1.60*** | 1.55*** | 1.42*** | 0.62*** |
| Hui X Non-Han Parent is Mother | | | | 2.73*** | | | | 2.64*** |
| Tibetan | 1.04 | 1.08 | 2.02*** | 566,047.09 | 1.23 | 1.27* | 1.77*** | 0.26*** |
| Tibetan X Non-Han Parent is Mother | | | | 0.00 | | | | 8.90*** |
| Miao | 0.83** | 0.83** | 0.87 | 0.94 | 1.09 | 1.10* | 1.15** | 1.12 |
| Miao X Non-Han Parent is Mother | | | | 0.91 | | | | 1.03 |
| Yi | 0.58*** | 0.60*** | 0.41*** | 0.53*** | 0.76*** | 0.77*** | 0.88* | 0.89 |
| Yi X Non-Han Parent is Mother | | | | 0.78 | | | | 0.99 |
| Zhuang | 0.35*** | 0.34*** | 0.29*** | 0.90 | 0.23*** | 0.23*** | 0.24*** | 0.63*** |
| Zhuang X Non-Han Parent is Mother | | | | 0.24*** | | | | 0.29*** |
| Bouyi | 0.77** | 0.77** | 0.76 | 1.22 | 0.78*** | 0.80** | 0.75*** | 0.62* |
| Bouyi X Non-Han Parent is Mother | | | | 0.58 | | | | 1.23 |
| Age of child | 1.01 | 1.02* | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.02* | 1.03*** | 1.01 | 1.01 |
| Female (child) | 1.01 | 1.01 | 1.05 | 1.06 | 1.03 | 1.03 | 1.03 | 1.03 |
| Father's age | | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | | 0.99*** | 0.99*** | 0.99** |
| Father's education | | 1.03*** | 1.01 | 1.01 | | 1.02*** | 1.03*** | 1.02*** |
| Observations | 17,107 | 17,107 | 17,107 | 17,107 | 29,591 | 29,591 | 29,591 | 29,591 |

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

*Note:* Standard errors are not shown in this table.

*Note:* Due to small sample size in interaction models and issues of interpretation, we do not present results for the Uygurs and Koreans.

*Note:* China 1982 and 1990 Population Census, 1 Percent Microsample, China National Bureau of Statistics 2011.

**Table 6. Predicted Probabilities of Strategic Identification of Child as Minority in Inter-ethnic Households, by Ethnic Category and Census Year**

| | 1982 | | | | 1990 | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | (1a) | (2a) | (4a) | | (1b) | (2b) | (4b) | |
| | Baseline | Father's age and education | Ethnic category X Non-Han Parent is Mother | Ethnic category X Non-Han Parent is Father | Baseline | Father's age and education | Ethnic category X Non-Han Parent is Mother | Ethnic category X Non-Han Parent is Father |
| *Ethnic Category of Minority Parent* | | | | | | | | |
| Manchu | 0.64 | 0.64 | 0.19 | 0.97 | 0.77 | 0.75 | 0.56 | 0.94 |
| Mongol | 0.85 | 0.85 | 0.68 | 0.99 | 0.89 | 0.88 | 0.82 | 0.97 |
| Hui | 0.74 | 0.73 | 0.46 | 0.96 | 0.79 | 0.78 | 0.56 | 0.95 |
| Tibetan | 0.63 | 0.65 | 0.41 | 0.99 | 0.74 | 0.74 | 0.65 | 0.89 |
| Miao | 0.58 | 0.59 | 0.25 | 0.96 | 0.72 | 0.71 | 0.48 | 0.97 |
| Yi | 0.49 | 0.51 | 0.14 | 0.94 | 0.64 | 0.63 | 0.41 | 0.96 |
| Zhuang | 0.37 | 0.37 | 0.08 | 0.96 | 0.35 | 0.34 | 0.12 | 0.95 |
| Bouyi | 0.56 | 0.57 | 0.21 | 0.97 | 0.65 | 0.64 | 0.37 | 0.95 |
| Korean | 0.29 | 0.28 | 0.24 | 0.50 | 0.41 | 0.40 | 0.27 | 0.64 |
| Other | 0.63 | 0.63 | 0.28 | 0.97 | 0.70 | 0.69 | 0.44 | 0.97 |

*Note:* Predicted probabilities for 1982 and 1990 estimated from Table 5, models 1a and 1b (baseline), models 2a and 2b (father's age and education), and models 4a and 4b (ethnic category interacted with non-Han parent is mother).

*Note:* Child's sex, age and father's education and age are set to mean in 1982. Predicted probabilities for 1990 have age and sex of child, as well as age and education of father set at average and proportion for 1982. Average age in 1982 = 2.46, proportion female = 0.485, father's age = 32.10, father's education = 6.52 years.

*Note:* China 1982 and 1990 Population Census, 1 Percent Microsample, China National Bureau of Statistics 2011.

**Table 7. Average Values on Key Analytic Variables for Analytic Sample by Ethnic Category and Census Year**

| | Total N for Analytic Sample | | Average age of ethnic group | | Geographical dis. index | | Average years of education | | Cultural representation index | | Relaxed fertility policy index | | College advantage index | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Ethnicity | 1982 | 1990 | 1982 | 1990 | 1982 | 1990 | 1982 | 1990 | 1982 | 1990 | 1982 | 1990 | 1982 | 1990 |
| Han | -- | -- | 26.74 | 28.48 | 0 | 0 | 5.02 | 6.01 | 2.37 | 2.32 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Manchu | 3081 | 5935 | 25.43 | 25.85 | 83.1 | 83.8 | 6.06 | 6.74 | 3.91 | 3.31 | -0.218 | -0.281 | -1.2 | 1.5 |
| Mongol | 1323 | 3070 | 23.23 | 23.70 | 90.0 | 88.6 | 5.14 | 6.34 | 5.62 | 5.40 | 1.253 | 0.640 | 4.3 | 3.3 |
| Uygur | 1 | 6 | 24.58 | 24.30 | 99.3 | 99.3 | 3.91 | 5.18 | 2.38 | 2.72 | 0.936 | 1.443 | 4.6 | 3.9 |
| Hui | 641 | 1237 | 24.89 | 26.50 | 60.6 | 68.5 | 4.31 | 5.16 | 2.48 | 2.62 | 0.513 | 0.293 | -1.3 | -2.3 |
| Tibetan | 90 | 186 | 25.21 | 25.69 | 98.4 | 98.5 | 1.64 | 1.68 | 1.77 | 4.62 | -2.422 | 1.207 | 11.9 | 12.3 |
| Miao | 538 | 1513 | 23.72 | 25.39 | 91.7 | 92.3 | 2.78 | 4.17 | 1.16 | 1.42 | 1.351 | 1.176 | -1.7 | 3.4 |
| Yi | 619 | 1075 | 23.70 | 25.05 | 94.9 | 95.4 | 2.47 | 3.58 | 1.20 | 1.30 | 1.324 | 1.824 | -0.9 | 3.1 |
| Zhuang | 1249 | 1395 | 24.89 | 26.32 | 95.7 | 95.1 | 4.67 | 5.56 | 1.94 | 2.01 | 0.397 | 0.853 | -1.3 | 1.8 |
| Bouyi | 210 | 391 | 24.95 | 26.27 | 97.6 | 97.7 | 3.00 | 3.91 | 1.39 | 1.51 | 1.085 | 1.206 | -5.4 | 3.5 |
| Korean | 20 | 81 | 26.93 | 29.20 | 90.5 | 89.3 | 4.05 | 7.48 | 4.69 | 5.44 | -0.737 | -0.638 | 1.2 | 6.0 |
| Other | 2325 | 5535 | 24.22 | 25.31 | 88.3 | 87.0 | 3.64 | 4.79 | 1.75 | 2.04 | 0.956 | 1.024 | 2.3 | 4.2 |

*Note:* The geographical dissimilarity index, college advantage index, and cultural representation index are all multiplied by 100.

*Note*: The relaxed fertility policy index presented in this table between minority and Han averages of child ever born among women aged 40 – 50.

*Note*: The value for relaxed fertility policy index in 1982 for Tibetan seems implausibly low; however, the value here is consistent with low fertility rates reported from other sources (Attane and Courbage 2000; Mundigo 1999).

*Note:* China 1982 and 1990 Population Census, 1 Percent Microsample, China National Bureau of Statistics 2011.

**Table 8. Odds Ratios of Logistic Regression Models of Strategic Minority Identification of Children among Inter-ethnic Parents, by Key Analytic Variables and Census Year**

| | 1982 | | | | | 1990 | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | (1a) | (2a) | (3a) | (4a) | (5a) | (1b) | (2b) | (3b) | (4b) | (5b) |
| *Group Difference Variables* | | | | | | | | | | |
| Geographical dis. index | 0.95*** | | | | | 0.93*** | | | | |
| | (0.003) | | | | | (0.003) | | | | |
| Average years of ed. | | 1.13*** | | | | | 1.23*** | | | |
| | | (0.019) | | | | | (0.018) | | | |
| Cultural repres. index | | | 1.33*** | | | | | 1.38*** | | |
| | | | (0.020) | | | | | (0.025) | | |
| *Policy incentives* | | | | | | | | | | |
| Relaxed fertility policy | | | | 0.45*** | | | | | 0.41*** | |
| index = 1 (ref: 0) | | | | (0.025) | | | | | (0.018) | |
| Relaxed fertility policy | | | | 1.01 | | | | | 0.48*** | |
| index = 2 | | | | (0.048) | | | | | (0.020) | |
| College advantage index | | | | | 1.25*** | | | | | 0.92*** |
| | | | | | (0.015) | | | | | (0.007) |
| *Control variables* | | | | | | | | | | |
| Average age of ethnic | 1.00*** | 1.00** | 1.00 | 1.00*** | 1.00* | 0.52*** | 0.53*** | 0.60*** | 0.51*** | 0.48*** |
| group | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.012) | (0.013) | (0.015) | (0.011) | (0.015) |
| Observations | 17,107 | 17,107 | 17,107 | 17,107 | 17,107 | 29,591 | 29,591 | 29,591 | 29,591 | 29,591 |

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

*Note*: In this table, the relaxed fertility policy index presented in this table between minority and Han averages of child ever born among women is coded into three categories: 0 if the value is below 0, 1 if the value is between 0 and 0.9, and 2 if the value is equal of greater to 0.9.

*Note:* China 1982 and 1990 Population Census, 1 Percent Microsample, China National Bureau of Statistics 2011.